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Abstract
Focusing theory hypothesizes a bias toward concentration according to which consumers prefer
goods with one outstanding feature over those with several smaller sized upsides. In contrast to mod-
els of present-biased behavior, focusing theory prescribes also future-biased behavior if an option’s
future reward is particularly outstanding. Our laboratory experiment yields substantial support for
the bias toward concentration and finds both present-biased and future-biased choices as predicted by
focusing theory.
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1 Introduction
In order to form a preference ordering between alternatives, their different dimensions have
to be evaluated and traded-off. Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) provide a model of attentional fo-
cusing according to which agents evaluate options locally, that is, based on their eye-catching
dimensions. This assumption is supported by psychological evidence suggesting that a deci-
sion maker’s attention is limited and thus attracted by outstanding choice features (Taylor and
Thompson, 1982; Kahneman, 2011).
We test focusing theory (Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013) in the context of inter-temporal decision
making. Intertemporal decisions represent a major class of decision situations to be analyzed in
economics and give rise to clearly defined choice dimensions—namely points in time where the
available alternatives yield payoffs. According to Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), a decision maker
focuses on payments at such points in time where the payment differences between her avail-
able options are large, but rather neglects payments at points in timewhere these differences are
small. Therefore, focusing predicts a bias toward concentration such that a decisionmaker chooses
options with rather concentrated large advantages relative to alternatives with many small dis-
persed advantages. The more balanced a choice is, that is, the more similar the dispersion of
the alternatives’ advantages over the choice dimensions is, the more rational decisions are hy-
pothesized to be made. In contrast, unbalanced decision situations (where the distribution of
the advantages over the choice dimensions differs significantly among the alternatives) induce
focusing effects and decision errors. As Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) point out, many “lifestyles
choices” such as exercise, harmful consumption, and consumption-savings fall into this cate-
gory of unbalanced decision situations.
Thereby, focusing results in a new theory of intertemporal decision making which opposes
the prevalent quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997) under certain circumstances.
While the latter predicts present-biased choices in general, focusing predicts biased choices only
in decision situations where the advantages’ distribution is unbalanced among the alternatives.
But in a sharp contrast to other discounting models, focusing theory prescribes future-biased
choices if future rewards are sufficiently concentrated while alternative sooner rewards are dis-
persed.
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Whether financial decisions are prone to focusing effects has important implications for the
framing of actual financial contracts. Consider for instance an annuity agreement according to
which a certain percentage of the wage is saved each month. Typically, at the retiring age the
agent can either choose between a lump-sum payment and a monthly annuity. According to
focusing, the framing of the expected savings may impact on the expected savings. While a
rational agent may be indifferent between the annuity and the lump sum, the large lump sum
is more appealing for the focused thinker. Therefore, a focused thinker may be willing to agree
to a higher savings rate if the expected payout of an annuity contract is framed as a one-time
payment. Thus, the frame may serve as an important nudge to induce higher savings rates. In
order to assess the impact of this nudge, however, it is important to know whether focusing
effects indeed impact on choices.
In this experimental study we test for a strong form of focusing effects, that is, whether
focusing theory can explain violations of revealed preferences. We test for the focusing effect in
two setups: in a present- and a future-bias frame. While our experiment involves intertemporal
decisions, we remain agnostic about how subjects discount payouts at different points in time.
As we employ a revealed preference approach, our elicitation of the focusing bias does not
require any assumptions on the functional form of the subject’s discounting function. We find
that a substantial share of around half of our subjects violate revealed preferences as predicted
by focusing theory.
Thereby, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to document the focusing bias
in a controlled environment, leading to new insights in particular with respect intertemporal
decision making. Focusing implies that agents do not have a present bias per se, but choices
could be also future-biased. It is the asymmetry of decision situations which induces subjects
to make suboptimal decisions.
2 The model
An agent chooses a monetary bundle c = (c0, . . . , cN−1) from a finite setC ⊂ RN where c0 gives
c’s present payout and ck denotes c’s payout k periods ahead. Suppose that for all 0 ≤ k ≤ N−1
there is a strictly monotonically increasing utility function uk(·) : R→ Rwhich gives the utility
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of a monetary Euro-payout k periods ahead.1 Suppose that this utility is non-convex, uk(·)′′ ≤
0,2 and set uk(0) = 0 for all k.
Rational choice. A rational agent maximizes her consumption utility U(·) : RN → R which is
additively separable over points in time and given by
U(c) :=
N−1∑
k=0
uk(ck).
Focusing. In contrast to rational choice, focusing theory (Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013) hypothe-
sizes that the valuation of an item c ∈ C depends on the choice set C it is chosen from. We call
an agent choosing in line with focusing theory a focused thinker. Instead of consumption utility,
a focused thinker maximizes her focus-weighted utility
U(c|C) :=
N∑
k=1
wk uk(ck). (1)
Factor wk denotes the distorted decision weight a focused thinker assigns to dimension k and
is defined by the following two assumptions.
A1. wk := w(∆k(C)), where ∆k(C) = maxc∈C uk(ck) − minc∈C uk(ck) denotes the range of
feasible utility along dimension k
A2. w(·) is strictly increasing on (0,∞)
The first assumption states that decision weights are range dependent. According to the sec-
ond assumption, a focused thinker overweights a dimension inwhich her available options offer
a particularly wide range of utilities. Essentially, focusing theory predicts a bias toward con-
centration according to which a local thinker overvalues concentrated compared to dispersed
outcomes.
A decision situation with two options, each of which yields one payoff at one point in time,
is balanced as both options’ payouts are concentrated at one point in time. In such balanced
1This utility function may include any form of discounting such as exponential or quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
2Non-convexity of monetary utility has been shown in many studies, such as Bernoulli (1954); Coombs and Ko-
morita (1958); Wakker et al. (2007).
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choice situations focusing effects do not distort choices: a focused thinker chooses the option
which yields the higher consumption utility. Therefore, balanced choice situations allow to elicit
a focused thinker’s true preference ranking.
Thus, we use balanced decision situations in order to elicit ordinal preferences between dif-
ferent payouts at different points in time. Taking a revealed preference approach, we construct
an inferior option which a focused thinker is inclined to choose due to its concentrated benefit
while the superior option has dispersed benefits.
3 Design
Our experimental approach is to—in a first phase—elicit time preferences in an environment
where local thinking is aligned with rational choice while—in a second phase—we use these
elicited time preferences to construct decision environments in which subjects according to the
theory should exhibit a bias. In fact, in the first phase we use balanced choices for which focus-
ing theory prescribes rational behavior, while in the second phase we use unbalanced decision
situations for which attentional focusing predicts distorted choices.
First phase Elicitation of switching points in multiple price lists
Second phase Focusing decision
Control questions Cognitive Reflection Test
Memory
Demographics
Table 1: Experimental schedule
3.1 The experiment
For half of the subjects we tested for present-biased choices as predicted by focusing (Present
Frame), and for half of the subjects we tested for future-biased choices as predicted by focusing
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(Future Frame). All payments are made via bank transfers.
First Stage. In thePresent Frame, we elicited the largest amount ofx ∈ {5.00; 5.50; . . . ; 8.00}Euro
to be transferred today which is dominated by 8 Euro in one month. In the Future Frame, we
elicited the largest amount of x ∈ {5.00; 5.50; . . . ; 8.00} Euro to be transferred in one month
which is dominated by 8 Euro in two months.
Second Stage. Weelicited for all subjects the smallest amount of y ∈ {5.00; 5.50; . . . ; 10.00}Euro
in two months which is dominated by 5 Euro today.
Third Stage: Focusing question. We tested for the focusing bias in the present framing by
asking subjects in the present frame if they preferred
(A.) Today x+ 5 Euro or (B.) In one month 8 Euro and in two months y+ 0.50 Euro.
and in the future frame if they preferred
(A.) Today 5 Euro and x+ 0.50 Euro in one month or (B.) In two months 8 + y Euro.
Whoever opts for (A.) in the present frame violates her preferences revealed in the prior tasks
as predicted by focusing. Whoever chooses the concentrated payout (B.) in two months in the
future frame decides in line with local thinking, but forgoes surplus. We hypothesize that in
both groups a significant share of subjects reveal the focusing bias, that is, we test the following
Hypothesis.
Hypothesis. A significant share of subjects in both groups opt for the inferior option which gives a
concentrated reward.
3.2 Controls and filler tasks
To enhance subjects’ concentration on the decision making tasks, we included two filler tasks.
After the first multiple price list task, subjects in each treatment had to count all “1”s in a binary
code of 1,000 digits within six minutes. The closer the subject’s result to the true value, the
higher her resulting payment. The next filler task, in which eight trivia questions had to be
answered, was set prior to the task that tests for the focusing bias.
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In addition, we included two controls which we tested for after all the other tasks had been
accomplished (the ordering of tasks is given in Table 1). In order to control for mental capabil-
ities, we included the cognitive reflection test (CRT; see Frederick, 2005) which is highly corre-
lated with the IQ as Toplak et al. (2011) and Frederick (2005) report. Furthermore, we tested for
subjects’ memory by repeating the second price list choice task in which subjects chose between
5 Euro today and an overall future sum of between 5 and 10 Euro. Here, subjects should match
their decisions made during the first iteration of this task.
3.3 Incentivization
To avoid differences in the payment mechanism between the options, all sums were paid via
bank transfers. All points in time mentioned throughout our experiment do not indicate the
date on which the respective sum is received, but the date on which it is transferred to their
bank account. To enhance our trustworthiness, we adopted the procedure by Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012) and provided all subjects with the contact information (phone and email) of
one of the authors (Riener) and encouraged them to contact him immediately if any payments
were delayed. As Andreoni and Sprenger state, this invitation to inconvenience a professor was
intended to boost confidence that future payments would arrive as promised.
One task is selected by the computer at random for payout. Each of the multiple price list
tasks and the counting, trivia, memory and CRT tasks are chosen with an equal probability.
Only this chosen task, the payment task, is paid. The multiple price list tasks are incentivized via
the standard procedure that one line is randomly selected and the chosen option is paid at the
indicated point in time. For the other tasks, correct answers are paid.
3.4 Implementation
The experimentwas implemented at theDICE laboratory at theUniversity of Düsseldorf in June
2014 and December 2015. In total, 89 student subjects—recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004)—
participated in the experiment. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
An average session lasted 45 minutes and the average payout was 9 Euros, with a minimum of
3 and a maximum of 16.50 Euros.
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4 Results
First, we categorized subjects according to their answers in these three tasks as follows. A subject
is “inconsistent” if she revealed more than one switching point in at least one of the multiple
price list tasks. If a subject always opted for the earlier payout in at least one of the multiple
price list tasks, then our procedure does not allow to construct the inferior option we need,
such that we categorize her as “not classifiable” as–if present– we cannot identify the focusing
bias for this subject. We find that three of the subjects behaved inconsistently and nine were not
classifiable.
Frame Present (n=43) Future (n=46) Total (n=89)
No focusing bias 44.2% 41.3% 42.7%
Focusing bias 46.5% 41.3% 43.8%
Not classifiable 7.0% 13.0% 10.1%
Inconsistent 2.3% 4.2% 3.4%
Note: This table shows subjects demonstrating the focusing bias in the present and in the future frame. There is
no significant difference between the present and the future frame judging by a χ2-test, p-value=0.73, excluding
subjects who are either inconsistent or not classifiable.
Table 2: Classification of choices in percentages
We find substantial evidence of the descriptive power of focusing theory for actual decisions
(Table 2) as around 44 percent of the subjects reveal the focusing bias (test of probabilities, p-
value <0.001). This confirms our Hypothesis.3
Since decisions in line with focusing violate one’s own revealed preferences, local thinkers
commit real decision errors. We run robustness checks using linear regression models with the
binary Focusing bias as the dependent variable to control for cognitive ability via the CRT and
for gender. We included three binary variables CRT-1, CRT-2, and CRT-3 indicatingwhether the
3According to task “Memory”, subjects can on average correctly remember 10.76 out of their 11 decisions, which
indicates that subjects’ choices were deliberate and which therefore is a strong support for our revealed preference
approach.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Focusing bias Focusing bias Focusing bias Focusing bias
Future frame -0.0391 -0.0310 0.0368
(0.115) (0.115) (0.175)
Female 0.0915 0.0931 0.159
(0.115) (0.116) (0.172)
Future × Female -0.128
(0.240)
CRT-1 0.0158 0.0166 -0.00203
(0.152) (0.154) (0.160)
CRT-2 -0.108 -0.111 -0.125
(0.150) (0.150) (0.154)
CRT-3 -0.293* -0.289 -0.316*
(0.174) (0.176) (0.176)
Constant 0.526*** 0.524*** 0.539*** 0.517***
(0.0821) (0.108) (0.122) (0.130)
Observations 77 77 77 77
Note: This table reports the linear probability model with having the focusing bias is the dependent variable. The
sample includes only subjects who are classifiable and showed a consistent behavior. Robust standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 3: Linear probability model: Focusing vs. rational choice
subject answered one, two or three CRT-questions correctly. Column (1) of Table 3 corroborates
our previous observation that there is no significant difference between the present and the
future framel. In column (2) we report a weakly significant negative relationship between the
results of the cognitive reflection test and the focusing bias. Scoring the highest score of three
is related to a 30 percentage point decrease in the susceptibility to the focusing bias. The size of
the coefficients remains when controlling for the future frame (Column (3)) and the interaction
of the future framewith gender (Column (4)). This is in line with the findings byOechssler et al.
(2009) who find a relationship between cognitive biases and cognitive skills.
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5 Conclusion
We find substantial support for focusing theory (Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013) in intertemporal
choices. A large share of subjects violate their revealed preferences in a manner which is con-
sistent with focusing. We find weak evidence that this bias reduces with cognitive ability as
measured by the cognitive reflection test.
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A Instructions
Here, we provide the instructions of the basic treatment and a representative screenshot.
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Information regarding the experiment 
Important: You need your bank account details! Otherwise you cannot participate in this 
experiment, unfortunately! 
Welcome to this experimental study. Please note that you are not allowed to talk to other participants during the 
whole experiment. Please do not make use of additional informational devices like the internet or your cell phone 
during the duration of the experiment. 
You have to do 7 different tasks during the experiment. You have an incentive to answer all questions honestly 
since every single decision could affect your payment at the end of the experiment! 
After finishing all tasks, at the end of the experiment one task will be chosen randomly; this task will be your 
payment task. Your answers in this task exclusively determine your payment. Answers given in tasks other than the 
payment task do not affect your payment at all. All tasks obtain the same probability of being chosen as the payment 
task. Since you are not able to influence which task will be chosen, you have got an incentive to answer all questions 
as well and honestly as possible. 
How you will be rewarded for each task, will be declared within the task description on the screen. None of your 
decisions is negotiable afterwards, all of your decisions are binding. 
In any case you receive a show-up fee of 1 euro today and 1 euro in exactly one month by bank transfer. Therefore, 
we need your bank account details. The payment task will be rewarded by bank transfer as well. Independent of the 
possible additional payments due to the payment task, you receive the show-up fee of two times 1 euro (today and 
in one month) definitely via two separate bank transfers.  
Depending on the task chosen to be paid and how you decide within this task the amounts which will be transferred 
to your bank account at these two dates can increase.  
We guarantee to handle your personal bank account details confidentially and transfer the amount when due. 
Please immediately contact Jun. Prof. Dr. Gerhard Riener (0211-81-10252 or riener@dice.hhu.de) if problems 
regarding the bank transfers arise. 
Please note the time display in the upper right-hand corner of the screen during the experiment. Please answer all 
questions within the given time. If not all questions are answered, it could be that you will not earn anything in the 
particular task: for some tasks once the time is over you will automatically be moved onto the next task. You cannot 
get to the screen with the next task until all participants have accomplished the last one and clicked the OK-button. 
If you have a question, you can appeal to the experimenter at any time. Raise your hand and we will come to your 
desk and answer your question personally. 
After the end of the experiment, please remain seated at your desk till you are called. 
Good Luck!  
Figure 1: Translated instructions for the experiment
Figure 2: A translated screen-shot including the instructions for task 1.
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